UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-2-2013

State v. Kesling Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39484

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Kesling Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39484" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1430.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1430

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

OF IDAHO,

)
39484 & 39485 & 39486

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)

v.

)

SHAWN M. KESLING,

)

ADA COUNTY NOS. CR 2003-557,
2003-379 & 2003-589

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

)

Defendant-Appellant.

BRI

)

OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE DARLA S. WILLIAMSON
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
l.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
l.S.B. #6247

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P .0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
l.S.B. #7353
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................. 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................... 6
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 7
I.

The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Revoke
Mr. Kesling's Probation In 39486 .......................................................... 7
A. Introduction ..................................................................................... 7
B. Standard of Review ......................................................................... 7
C. The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Revoke
Mr. Kesling's Probation In 39486 .................................................... 7

II. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr.. Kesling's Motion
For Credit For Time Served .................................................................. 9
A. Introduction ...................................................................................... 9
B. Standard of Review ........................................................................ 10
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kesling's
Motion For Credit For Time Served ............................................... 10
1. Mr. Kesling's Probation Violation Allegations Were
Based Upon Precisely The Same Acts The Gave Rise
To His Florida Charges ............................................................ 13
2. The Detainer Warrant Serves As The Functional
Equivalent Of A Bench Warrant ............................................... 15
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 20
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .............................................................................. 21

Mickelsen v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352 (Ct. App. 1998) .................. 10
State v. Alberlson, 135 Idaho 723 (Ct. App. 2001 ). .......................................... 11
State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608 (1992) ................................................................ 16
State v. Bronkema, 109 Idaho 211 (Ct. App. 1985) ............................................ 15
State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122 (Ct. App. 1996) .............................................. 12, 16
State v. Coverl, 143 Idaho 169 (Ct. App. 2006) ...................................... 10, 16, 17
State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6 (2002) ...................................................................... 16
State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827 (Ct App. 2010) .................................................. 9
State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763 (1989) .................................................................. 13
State v. Hom, 124 Idaho 849 (Ct. App. 1993) .............................................. 11, 13
State v. Lively, 131 Idaho 279 (1998) ........................................................... 12, 16
State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................................. 14
State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223 (2004) ........................................................... 7, 17
State v. Swain, 122 Idaho 918 (Ct. App. 1992) ................................................... 15
State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68 (Ct. App. 2005) ........................................ ., 13
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) ..................................................... 15
Constitutional Provisions
l.C. § 18-309 .......................................................................................... 11, 12, 13
l.C. § 18-3106(a) .................................................................................................. 8
l.C. § 19-2601 (7) .............................................................................................. 7, 8
l.C. § 19-2602 ....................................................................................................... 9
I. C. § 19-2603 .............................................................................................. passim
l.C. § 19-5001 ..................................................................................................... 15
l.C. § 20-209A ........................................................................................ 11, 12, 13
l.C. § 20-222 ......................................................................................................... 9

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Shawn Kesling appeals following the district court's order correcting judgment
pursuant to l.C.R. 35(a) and the district court's order denying his motion for credit for
time served. Mr. Kesling asserts that the district court erred in revoking his probation in
39486 as the probationary term had expired. Mr. Kesling also asserts that the district
court erred when it denied his motion requesting credit for time served on his Idaho
state sentence, as he was held pursuant to a detainer warrant twenty days before he
had finished serving his Florida sentence.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Supreme Court Docket No. 39484 (district court case number 2003-557

(hereinafter, 39484)), Supreme Court Docket No. 39485 (district court case number
2003-589 (hereinafter, 39485)), and Supreme Court Docket No. 39486 (district court
case number 2003-379 (hereinafter, 39486)) have been consolidated for appellate
purposes. (R., pp.2-3.)
In 2003, in docket number 39484, Mr. Kesling was convicted of one count of
felony forgery. (R., pp.61-65.) In docket number 39485, Mr. Kesling was convicted of
one count of grand theft by deception.

(R., pp.228-232.)

In docket number 39486,

Mr. Kesling was convicted of one count of felony issuing a check without funds. (R.,
pp.418-422.) In docket number 39484, the district court imposed a unified sentence of
nine years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.61-65.) In docket number 39485, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of nine years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.228-232.)
In docket number 39486, the district court also imposed a unified sentence of nine
years, with two years fixed, and all three sentences were to run concurrent with each
1

other. (R., pp.418-422.) The court placed Mr. Kesling on probation for nine years in all
three cases. (R., pp.61-65, 228-232, 418-422.)
Mr. Kesling's probation was transferred to Florida.

(39484, 39485, 39486

State v. Kesling PSl.pdf (hereinafter, PSI), pp.4, 16.) Although a motion for probation
violation was filed on December 9, 2004, because Mr. Kesling had not paid the entirety
of his restitution, the parties stipulated to extend the time and means by which
Mr. Kesling would pay his restitution and the warrant was quashed on December 22,
2004.

(R., pp.75-82, 236-243, 425-432.)

On January 3, 2005, the district court

amended the judgment of conviction and order of probation. 1 (R., pp.85, 246, 435.) On
October 31, 2005, Mr. Kesling's probation was modified to allow him to have a bank
account, credit card, etc., and to allow him to manage his own finances. 2 (R., pp.86,
247, 442.)
On March 4, 2008, Mr. Kesling was sentenced to a forty-five (45) month term of
incarceration in the Florida Department of Correction in a Florida state case.
pp.5-6.)

(PSI.,

That same day, Mr. Kesling's file was marked "NOTIFY 080, PROB TO []

FOLLOW DC/ 07-4206-CFA." 3 (PSI., p.130.)

In all three cases a Motion for Bench

Warrant for Probation Violation based solely on the new Florida convictions was filed on
March 26, 2008, and an Order for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation was filed on

1

The parties stipulated to amend a paragraph of the Judgment of Conviction and Order
of Probation to read that all fines, costs, fees, and restitution owed to be paid in full after
Mr. Kesling settled his pending personal injury claim. (R., pp.83-85, 244-246, 433-435.)
2
Mr. Kesling's probationary terms dictated that he not have a bank account, credit card,
and shall not make any purchases on credit without prior approval by the probation
officer, and shall allow his spouse to manage their finances. (R.,pp.64, 231, 421.)
3
It appears that on March 4, 2008, Idaho Probation & Parole asked to be notified before
Mr. Kesling was to be discharged. This interpretation is borne out in the description
preceding the notations, "the following reflects detainers against this record, and/or
requests to be notified prior to release of the inmate." (PSI, p.130.) However, neither

2

March 27, 2008. (R., pp.90-94, 251-255, 447-452.) A Bench Warrant was issued on
March 28, 2008, but not served until March 29, 2011; it was filed on March 30, 2011.
(R., pp.95-96, 256-257, 452-453.)
Before he had finished serving his Florida sentence, on March 2, 2011, the
"notify" from Idaho was changed to a "detain" designation. (PSI, p.130.) Presumably
this meant that a detainer warrant had been placed on Mr. Kesling. (See PSI, p.130.)
After he finished serving his sentence on the Florida case on March 22, 2011,
Mr. Kesling was held without bail or bond to be transported back to Idaho.
pp.130-131.)

(PSI,

When he finally arrived in Idaho approximately seven days later,

Mr. Kesling was served with the bench warrant for the probation violations in each of his
three Idaho cases. (R., pp.95-96, 256-257, 452-453; 12/8/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-5.)
Mr. Kesling admitted that he violated his probation by incurring new charges. (R.,
pp.125-126.)
Counsel for Mr. Kesling then filed a Motion for Additional Credit Time Served.
(R., pp.132, 298, 491.) In the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Credit for Time
Served, relying upon Idaho Code sections 18-309 and 19-2603, and the Court of
Appeals' decision in State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169 (Ct. App. 2006), Mr. Kesling sought
1121 days of credit for the time he served from March 2008, when the detainer warrant
was lodged until the date the Bench Warrant was officially served, on March 29, 2011. 4
(R., pp.132-141, 298-307, 491-500.)

In the supporting memorandum, counsel relied

upon State v. Covert for the proposition that other types of warrants can serve as the

the record on appeal nor the register of actions contains information as to what
documents, if any, were sent to notify Florida of the Idaho cases.
4
Mr. Kesling has since learned that the 2008 hold that had been described as a
"detainer" was actually a request by Idaho Probation and Parole for Florida authorities
to "notify" them when he was released from custody in Florida. (PSI, p.130.)

3

"functional equivalent of a bench warrant" such that a probationer can receive credit on
his sentence after an agent's warrant has been served. (R., pp.137-138, 303-304, 496497.)
After the district court heard arguments on Mr. Kesling's motion for credit for time
served, it revoked his probation. 8/18/11 Tr., p.5, L.10 - p.7, L.2; 12/8/11 Tr., p.26, L.6
- p.28, L6.) The district court revoked Mr. Kesling's probation and credited him with 479
days in 39484, 494 days in 39485, and 479 days in 39486. 5 . (R., pp.151-152, 317-318,
510-511.) On December 14, 2011, Mr. Kesling filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the
district court's order.

(R., pp.154-156, 320-322, 513-515.)

Mr. Kesling's counsel filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

On December 19, 2011,

(R., pp.157-159, 323-325, 516-

518.) A prose Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on January 20, 2012. (R., pp.161165, 327-331, 520-524.)
On January 8, 2013, in 39486, Mr. Kesling filed a pro se Motion to Correct
Judgment under Idaho Criminal Rule 35(c), with accompanying documents, including
the transcript of the probation violation disposition hearing before Judge Williamson on
December 8, 2011. (Motion to Correct Judgment, attached to Motion to Augment filed
April 2, 2013.) The State did not oppose Mr. Kesling's motion, and the district court
granted the Defendant's Motion to Correct Judgment, finding that in 39484, the amount
of credit for time served was initially miscalculated and Mr. Kesling received only 479
days of credit for time served. (Order on Amended Motion for Credit For Time Served,
attached to Motion to Augment filed April 2, 2013.)

The court found that on

December 31, 2012, it had granted Mr. Kesling 494 days of credit for time served on

5

At his disposition, the district court advised Mr. Kesling that he would receive
additional credit in the case he bonded out on, because he was sitting in custody on the
two other cases. (12/8/11 Tr., p.24, L.6 - p.26, L.20.)

4

39484 and, therefore, granted Mr. Kesling's motion in 39486, crediting Mr. Kesling with
494 days served. (Order on Amended Motion for Credit For Time Served, attached to
Motion to Augment filed April 2, 2013.)
Mr. Kesling then filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence [1.C.R. 35(a)] on
February 21, 2012. (R., pp.529-531.) Mr. Kesling contended that his unified sentence
of nine years, for the offense of Issuing a Check Without Funds in violation of l.C. S 183106(A) was illegal as a matter of law in that the maximum penalty for a violation of this
statute is three years.

(R., p.530.)

On March 16, 2012, the district court issued an

order correcting the judgment. (R., pp.544-545.) In its order, the district court revoked
the probation in 39486 entered on November 25, 2003, and re-sentenced Mr. Kesling to
serve a unified sentence of three years, with two years fixed, concurrent with the
sentences in 39484 and 39485. (R., pp.544-545.)
Mr. Kesling contends that the time after the detainer warrant was placed should
be credited to his Idaho probation violation sentence. Mr. Kesling was held in Florida 6
on the Idaho charges, beginning on March 2, 2011, and the Idaho bench warrant was
not served until March 29, 2011.
Mr. Kesling contends on appeal that the district court did not have jurisdiction to
revoke his probation in 39486, and it abused its discretion by denying his motion for
credit for time served in his cases.

6

At some point Mr. Kesling was in the process of being transported to Idaho during the
latter part of these dates.

5

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court have jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Kesling's probation in 39486?

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kesling's motion for credit for time
served?

6

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Revoke Mr. Kesling's
Probation In 39486

A.

Introduction
Mr. Kesling contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

when it revoked his probation in case 39486 because the violation that constituted the
basis for the district court's decision occurred after the court's jurisdiction had expired.
Mr. Kesling's probation should have been over on November 25, 2006; the acts that
constituted the sole basis for the probation violations occurred in March of
2007. Therefore, the district court did not have jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Kesling's

probation based upon events that occurred after the statutorily mandated term of
probation in 39486 had ended.

B.

Standard of Review
While personal jurisdiction may be waived, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be

waived and "may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal." State v.
Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227 (2004).

"Issues about the district court's jurisdiction are

issues of law, over which [Idaho appellate courts] exercise independent review." Id.

C.

The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Revoke Mr. Kesling's Probation
in 39486
"[U]nder a conviction or plea of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be

for a period of not more than the maximum period for which the defendant might have
been imprisoned." l.C. § 19-2601 (7). 7 The offense of issuing a check without sufficient

7

The relevant portion of Idaho Code §19-2601 (7) provides:
7

funds carries a maximum penalty of three years in the state penitentiary.
3106(a).8

l.C. § 18-

Thus, the nine-year period of probationary term in 39486 exceeded the

maximum allowed by statute.
On March 16, 2012, the district court issued an Order Revoking Probation,
Judgment of Conviction and Order of Commitment, and Order Correcting Judgment,
which corrected the error made in 39486 in 2003, when the district court sentenced

ML Kesling. (Order Correcting Judgment Pursuant, attached to Motion to Augment filed
on April 2, 2013.) The Order Correcting Judgment reduced Mr. Kesling's sentence in
39486 to three years, the maximum allowable by statute. (See l.C. § 18-3106(a); Order
Correcting Judgment, attached to Motion to Augment filed on April 2, 2013.) Consistent
with that correction, the longest period of time that Mr. Kesling could have been on
probation in 39486 was three years. See l.C. § 19-2601. Mr. Kesling was originally

The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under . . . a
conviction or plea of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be for a
period of not more than the maximum period for which the defendant
might have been imprisoned.
Idaho Code § 19-2601 (7).
8 The offense of issuing a check without funds provides:
Any person who for himself or as the agent or representative of another or
as an officer of a corporation, willfully, with intent to defraud shall make or
draw or utter or deliver, or cause to be made, drawn, uttered or delivered,
any check, draft or order for the payment of money upon any bank or
depositary, or person, or firm, or corporation, knowing at the time of such
making, drawing, uttering or delivery that the maker or drawer has no
funds in or credit with such bank or depositary, or person, or firm, or
corporation, for the payment in full of such check, draft or order upon its
presentation, although no express representation is made with reference
thereto, shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for a term not to exceed three (3) years or by a fine not to exceed
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Idaho Code§ 18-3106(a).

8

placed on probation on November 25, 2003. (R., p.412-424.) Therefore, Mr. Kesling's
probation in 39486 would have ended in November of 2006. 9
Mr. Kesling contends that although the district court correctly recognized in 2012
that his sentence in 39486 exceeded the maximum allowable by statute, it failed to
correct its error and find that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to revoke
Mr. Kesling's probation in 2011. See l.C. § 20-222; l.C. § 19-2602; see also State v.

Gamino, 148 Idaho 827 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that probation revocation proceedings
must be initiated during the period of probation).

As such, the district court lost

jurisdiction over Mr. Kesling in case number 39486 in November of 2006 and, therefore,
it did not have the authority to revoke his probation in 2011. This Court should dismiss
39486.

11.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kesling's Motion For Credit For Time
Served

A.

Introduction
Mr. Kesling asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for

credit for time served. First, as Mr. Kesling was being held on a detainer warrant to
later be transported back to Idaho to answer for his probation violation allegations, he
was not released by Florida authorities after he had completed his sentence. Second,
in light of the fact that this information 10 prohibited Mr. Kesling from being released,

9

Although a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation was filed on December 9,
2004, pursuant to the parties' stipulation the order for a bench warrant was
subsequently quashed by the district court on December 22, 2004 and the petition
withdrawn. (R., pp.425-432.)
10
The record on appeal does not indicate (or include) the specific document(s) received
by Florida from Idaho which apparently asked Florida officials to "notify" Idaho officials
when Mr. Kesling was due to be released, nor does the record contain the document(s)
which served to "detain" Mr. Kesling on the three Ada County cases after his release on

9

such constitutes a warrant per se, and he should receive credit for all time after the
placement of the detainer warrant on March 2, 2011.

For the reasons set forth herein,

he respectfully requests that this Court order that he be given credit for time served in
the amount of twenty days.

B.

Standard Of Review
A determination as to "[w]hether the district court· properly applied the law

governing credit for time served is a question of law over which" appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal,
the appellate court will "defer to the district court's findings of fact, however, unless
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous." Id.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kesling' Request For Credit For
Time Served
A sentence is imposed when it is initially pronounced. Mickelsen v. Idaho State

Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352, 355 (Ct. App. 1998). Idaho Code Section 18-309 governs
when credit must be given for both pre- and post-judgment incarceration:
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period
of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the
offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. The
remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of sentence
and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is
temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned
thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be computed as
part of such term.

the Florida charges. (See PSI, p.130.) Mr. Kesling reserves the right to supplement the
record with this information in his post-conviction case.
10

The language of l.C. § 18-309 entitles a defendant to credit for "any period of
incarceration" and notably does not base credit on any factor other than actual
incarceration.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]he directive of l.C. § 18-309 is
mandatory, specifying that a person shall receive credit." State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849,
850 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455 (1983)) (emphasis in
original). Although the first sentence of l.C. § 18-309 deals solely with pre-judgment
incarceration, the second sentence of l.C. § 18-309 addresses post-judgment
incarceration and awards credit for time served for any time served after the sentence is
commenced.
According to the second sentence of I. C. § 18-309, "the remainder of the term [of
imprisonment] commences upon the pronouncement of sentence .... " I. C. § 18-309.
The Court of Appeals has recognized that this sentence "impl[ies] that all time spent in
custody after sentencing is credited to the defendant's sentence." State v. Albertson,
135 Idaho 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

That court found that this second sentence

requires "credit against a sentence for any time spent in custody after the entry of
judgment, except periods of county jail incarceration that were served as a condition of
probation." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically found that an "order revoking
probation is not a judgment." Thomas, 146 Idaho at 594.
Further, l.C. § 20-209A addresses credit for time served both before and after
judgment. That section states:
When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of correction, his
term of confinement begins from the day of his sentence. A person who is
sentenced may receive credit toward service of his sentence for time
spent in physical custody pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that
11

detention was in connection with the offense for which the sentence was
imposed. The time during which the person is voluntarily absent from the
penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of the board of correction, or
from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall not be estimated or
counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced.
l.C. § 20-209A (emphasis added).
Thus section 20-209A recognizes that credit for any time in physical custody may
be awarded when the detention is merely "in connection with the offense . . . . "
l.C. § 20-209A.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that l.C. § 18-309, "does not directly
address the question of credit for time served after an entry of judgment for defendants,
who ... have been placed on probation but ultimately have had their probation revoked."

State v. Lively, 131 Idaho 279, 280 (1998).

Rather, l..C. § 19-2603 specifically

addresses credit for time served when a previously suspended sentence is executed, or
when a person has served a period of incarceration for probation violations during a
period of withheld judgment. See l.C. § 19-2603; State v. Buys, 129 Idaho at 127-28,
922 P.2d at 424-25 (granting credit for time served pursuant to l.C. § 19-2603 for prejudgment time involuntarily served during a period of withheld judgment after service of
the "functional equivalent" of a bench warrant). In relevant part, l.C. § 19-2603 states,
"the time such person shall have been at large under such suspended sentence shall
not be counted as a part of the term of his sentence, but the time of the defendant's

sentence shall count from the date of service of such bench warrant." 11 Id. (emphasis
added).

11

The language "of such bench warrant" appears to reference a bench warrant issued
pursuant to section 19-2602, which authorizes a court to issue a bench warrant if it is
proven to the court's satisfaction that the terms and conditions of probation have been
violated. See l.C. § 19-2602.
12

When l.C. § 18-309, § 19-2603, and § 20-209A are read together it is apparent
that credit for time served is awarded as follows:
Post-judgment incarceration is awarded for any actual incarceration which
occurs after the judgment (§ 18-309), so long as the incarceration is in
connection with the offense for which the sentence was imposed (§ 20209A), including when the time is served after service of a bench warrant
for a probation violation (§ 19-2603).
1.

Mr. Kesling's Probation Violation Allegations Were Based Upon Precisely
The Same Acts That Gave Rise To His Florida Charges

Mr. Kesling should have been entitled to credit for the period of time in which he
was incarcerated in Florida following the placement of the detention warrant by Florida
at the request of Idaho for the probation violations, as the probation violation allegation
was filed as a result of the offenses for which he was serving the 45 month sentence in
Florida. See l.C. § 18-309; § 19-2603; § 20-209A.
Credit for pre-judgment incarceration is awarded only if "such incarceration was

for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered." l.C. § 18309.

This "means that the right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment

incarceration is a consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the
sentence is imposed." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68 (Ct. App. 2005) (citation
omitted).

"Thus, there must be a causal effect between the offense and the

incarceration in order for the incarceration to be 'for' the offense, as the term is used in
l.C. § 18-309." Id.; see a/so State v. Hom, 124 Idaho 849 (Ct. App. (1994) (addressing

a request for prejudgment credit for time served and denying credit because the
prejudgment incarceration was not caused by or attributable to the charge for which the
sentence was imposed); State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763 (1989) (addressing a request for

13

prejudgment credit for time served and denying credit because the prejudgment
incarceration was not attributable to the charge for which the sentence was imposed).
The charges for which Mr. Kesling was serving prison time in Florida formed the
basis for his Idaho probation violation charges.

(R., pp.90-94, 251-255, 447-452.)

Further, due to the detainer warrant, Mr. Kesling was not free to leave after he
successfully served his time in Florida, but was held and then transported to Idaho. The
district court erred in denying Mr. Kesling's motion for credit time served, and he should
be credited with an additional twenty days on each of his Idaho cases.
This position is supported by Idaho case law. The facts of State v. McCarthy,
145 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 2008), are on point with the facts of Mr. Kesling's case.

In

McCarthy, the defendant incurred new charges while on probation in another case. Id.,
145 Idaho at 398. The State filed a motion for probation violation, based on the new

charges.

Id.

The defendant was arrested on a bench warrant for the probation

violations and a month later was arrested on an arrest warrant for the new charges. Id.
The district court denied the defendant's motion for credit on the probation violation
case from the time the warrant was served until the entry of judgment. Id. The Court of
Appeals in McCarthy found that "[w]hen it is the same acts that give rise to both
warrants for the defendant's arrest and the confinement is served simultaneously, it
cannot be said that the incarceration is uniquely attributable to either case individually."

McCarthy, 145 Idaho at 399. The Court of Appeals held that.the defendant was entitled
to credit on his probation violation sentence and remanded the case back to the district
court for entry of an order granting the defendant credit for the time he was in custody
on the probation violation. Id.

14

Mr. Kesling asserts that, because the facts in the record show that he is entitled
to twenty days of credit for time served, the district court erred when it denied his
request for credit for time served.
2.

The Detainer Warrant Serves As The Functional Equivalent Of A Bench
Warrant

The

term

"detainer"

is

not

defined

in

the

Interstate

Agreement

on

Detainers. However, in Bronkema, the Idaho Court of Appeals, citing the United States
Supreme Court, defined the term "detainer," as used in l.C. § 19-5001, as:
Entail[ing] some form of written communication initiated by
the receiving state which is filed or lodged with the custodial or
sending state requesting the sending state to notify the receiving
state of the prisoner's imminent release from custody, or to hold the
prisoner after his release for the receiving state.
State v. Bronkema, 109 Idaho 211, 214 (Ct. App. 1985) (parentheticals and emphasis
omitted) (citing Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S 716 (1985); United States v. Mauro, 436
U.S. 340 (1978)).
In Carchman v. Nash, the United States Supreme Court noted that the drafters of
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act defined a detainer as "a warrant filed against
a person already in custody with the purpose of insuring that he will be available to the
authority which has placed the detainer." 473 U.S. at 727, citing and quoting COUNCIL
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, PROGRAM FOR
1957, at 74 (1956) (emphasis added). Although the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Act does not apply to instances involving a probation violation, the definition adopted by
the drafters of the Agreement is instructive in defining a detainer is a type of warrant.
See State v. Swain, 122 Idaho 918, 920 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers Act does not apply to warrants or detainers for claims of
alleged probation violations).
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Idaho Code § 19-2603 mandates that when a defendant has been arrested on a
bench warrant for a probation violation and the probation is subsequently revoked, "the
time of the defendant's sentence shall count from the date of service of such bench
warrant." See also State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Lively,
131 Idaho 279, 280 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 127-28 (Ct. App.
1996). When a defendant serves jail time as a condition of probation, however, the
defendant is not entitled to the credit for that time served. State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 8
(2002); State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 609-610 (1992).
Idaho Code § 19-2603, clearly states that credit shall accrue after the service of a
bench warrant. However, although LC.§ 19-2603, only provides for credit after a bench
warrant has been served, Idaho appellate courts have found that the "functional
equivalent" of a bench warrant will also suffice to begin calculating the amount of credit
a defendant is entitled to. See Buys, 129 Idaho at 128; see also Coverl, 143 Idaho at
170-171.
In State v. Buys, the Idaho Court of Appeals granted the defendant's motion for
credit for time served pursuant to LC. § 19-2603 for pre-judgment time involuntarily
served during a period of withheld judgment. 129 Idaho at 127-28.

The Court of

Appeals noted that l.C. § 19-2603 provided that where a defendant has been arrested
and his probation revoked due to the violation, the defendant's incarceration from the
time the bench warrant was served will count as part of the sentence. Id., 129 Idaho at
127. However, the Court concluded that the district court erred in not allowing credit for
"discretionary time" the defendant served pursuant to an order of incarceration, as
defendant's liberty was affected and there was no term or condition of probation
allowing for discretionary jail time. Id. The Court found that the order, which appeared
16

to have been drafted by and issued at the request of the defendant's probation officer,
appeared to be the functional equivalent of a bench warrant issued as a consequence
of an alleged violation of the terms of probation. Id., 129 Idaho at 128.

Notably, the

Court found that the order affected the defendant's liberty, because, even though he
was also arrested for the new offense, he would have been eligible for release on bond
in the new case but for the order requiring his incarceration for a period of time for the
probation violation allegation.

Id.

The Court therefore concluded that the order for

incarceration was in substance and effect a bench warrant for the defendant's arrest in
connection with an alleged probation violation, and he was entitled to credit for time
served under I. C. § 19-2603. Id.
State v. Covert involved similar factual circumstances. 143 Idaho 169. In Covert,

the Idaho Court of Appeals found that an agent's warrant was the functional equivalent
of a bench warrant under § 19-2603, and the defendant was entitled to credit for the
time he had served as he would have been eligible for release on bond if not for the
agent's warrant. Id., 143 Idaho at 170-71.
Here, like the facts in Covert, the detainer warrant was the functional equivalent
of a bench warrant, as Mr. Kesling's freedom was affected. Mr. Kesling is entitled to
twenty additional days of credit for time served on his Idaho cases.
The register of actions does not indicate what document or documents were sent
to Florida that served as a warrant of detainer; however, similar to the facts of State v.
Rogers, a copy of the unserved bench warrant that was issued back in March of 2008

could have been used to detain Mr. Kesling.

See State

v.

Rogers, 140 Idaho 223

(2004) (finding that the district court did not intend to relinquish jurisdiction and it had
asked the prosecutor to get a bench warrant lodged as a detainer).
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This is supported by common sense and public policy reasons.

Once a

defendant has been detained, or his freedom restricted in such a way that he is not free
to leave his place of incarceration once he has finished serving his sentence, the means
by which he is detained should not be limited to a strict reading of the statute. Where,
as here, a bench warrant was issued, but not served for three years until the defendant
was returned to Idaho, it is axiomatic to vest the bench warrant with any real import.
Thus the physical service of a bench warrant, when a defendant can be held for a
substantial amount of time using documentation that restrains the defendant's way in
precisely the same means as a bench warrant, should not be determinative of whether
the defendant's sentence is credited. 12
The record establishes that a "notify" was placed on Mr. Kesling on March 4,
2008. (PSI, p.130.) A "detain" was placed on Mr. Kesling on March 2, 2011, from Ada
County, Idaho relating to probation violation allegations in his three Ada County cases.
(PSI, p.130.) There is no evidence that Mr. Kesling was ever released from the Idaho
detainer warrant and, in fact, the district court acknowledged that Mr. Kesling had been
eligible for release for a number of days before the bench warrant was actually served
on him:
I'm willing, though, because it appears that you were eligible to be
released from Florida earlier than when the bench warrant was actually
served on you. So I believe you were actually being held on a bench
warrant at that point, even though officially it hadn't been served on you.
(12/8/11 Tr., p.27, Ls.12-18.) The district court credited Mr. Kesling with the seven days
from the completion of his Florida sentence to the time he arrived in Idaho and was

12

The district court also noted that "fairness dictates that from the time that [Mr. Kesling]
w[as] eligible for release from Florida that [he's] entitled to additional credit." (12/8/11
Tr., p.29, Ls.2-4.)
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served with the bench warrant. 13 (12/8/11 Tr., p.28.) The district court otherwise denied
Mr. Kesling's motion for credit for time served. (See 12/8/11 Tr.)
Mr. Kesling was continuously incarcerated in Florida until March 22, 2011, when
he was transported to Idaho. (PSI, p.130-131.) Mr. Kesling was not served with the
bench warrant that was issued on March 4, 2008 until he arrived in Idaho on March 29,
2011. (12/8/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-5.) This resulted in a period of incarceration totaling 27
days for which Mr. Kesling should have received credit in his Idaho cases. (R., pp.9596, 256-257, 452-453.) While the district court properly recognized that Mr. Kesling was

entitled to an additional seven days, it denied Mr. Kesling's request for additional
credit. 14 (12/8/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.2-5, p.27, L.12 - p.28, L.2.)
This Court should hold that Mr. Kesling is entitled to c"redit of twenty days for the
period of incarceration in Florida during which an Idaho detainer warrant had been
placed on him which constrained his freedom upon completion of his Florida
sentence. Mr. Kesling should be credited with the additional twenty days served in
custody as the Florida cases gave rise to the probation violation allegations in the Idaho
cases.

13

The district court credited Mr. Kesling's cases with the additional seven days as
a Rule 35 request for leniency. (12/8/11 Tr., p.28, L.7 - p.29, L.5.)
4
Mr. Kesling originally asked for 1335 days of credit, dating back to the date on which
the "inquiry" was placed on his status, believing in good faith that this was a detainer
warrant. However, it has since come to Mr. Kesling's attention that perhaps he was not
"detained" until March 2, 2011. (See PSI, pp.124, 130.)
~ranting
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Kesling respectfully requests that this Court
dismiss case number 39486 and order that he be given additional credit for time served
in the amount of twenty days in his cases.
DATED this

2nd

day of April, 2013.

SALL Y'1:'.:coisttY
,~
Deputy State Appellate?Public Defender
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